Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epistemic Operators', 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal' and 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study''

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13 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
10631 If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10624 The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10629 If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
10628 The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10622 The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10626 Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
6445 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10630 Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
10627 Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]